Objave – Laboratorij za strojno inteligenco

2022

Osorio-Roig, Daile; Rathgeb, Christian; Drozdowski, Pawel; Terhörst, Philipp; Štruc, Vitomir; Busch, Christoph

An Attack on Feature Level-based Facial Soft-biometric Privacy Enhancement Članek v strokovni reviji

V: IEEE Transactions on Biometrics, Identity and Behavior (TBIOM), vol. 4, iss. 2, str. 263-275, 2022.

Povzetek | Povezava | BibTeX | Oznake: attack, face recognition, privacy, privacy enhancement, privacy protection, privacy-enhancing techniques, soft biometric privacy

@article{TBIOM_2022,

title = {An Attack on Feature Level-based Facial Soft-biometric Privacy Enhancement},

author = {Daile Osorio-Roig and Christian Rathgeb and Pawel Drozdowski and Philipp Terhörst and Vitomir Štruc and Christoph Busch},

url = {https://arxiv.org/pdf/2111.12405.pdf},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-05-02},

urldate = {2022-05-02},

journal = {IEEE Transactions on Biometrics, Identity and Behavior (TBIOM)},

volume = {4},

issue = {2},

pages = {263-275},

abstract = {In the recent past, different researchers have proposed novel privacy-enhancing face recognition systems designed to conceal soft-biometric information at feature level. These works have reported impressive results, but usually do not consider specific attacks in their analysis of privacy protection. In most cases, the privacy protection capabilities of these schemes are tested through simple machine learning-based classifiers and visualisations of dimensionality reduction tools. In this work, we introduce an attack on feature level-based facial soft–biometric privacy-enhancement techniques. The attack is based on two observations: (1) to achieve high recognition accuracy, certain similarities between facial representations have to be retained in their privacy-enhanced versions; (2) highly similar facial representations usually originate from face images with similar soft-biometric attributes. Based on these observations, the proposed attack compares a privacy-enhanced face representation against a set of privacy-enhanced face representations with known soft-biometric attributes. Subsequently, the best obtained similarity scores are analysed to infer the unknown soft-biometric attributes of the attacked privacy-enhanced face representation. That is, the attack only requires a relatively small database of arbitrary face images and the privacy-enhancing face recognition algorithm as a black-box. In the experiments, the attack is applied to two representative approaches which have previously been reported to reliably conceal the gender in privacy-enhanced face representations. It is shown that the presented attack is able to circumvent the privacy enhancement to a considerable degree and is able to correctly classify gender with an accuracy of up to approximately 90% for both of the analysed privacy-enhancing face recognition systems. Future works on privacy-enhancing face recognition are encouraged to include the proposed attack in evaluations on privacy protection.},

keywords = {attack, face recognition, privacy, privacy enhancement, privacy protection, privacy-enhancing techniques, soft biometric privacy},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

Zapri

In the recent past, different researchers have proposed novel privacy-enhancing face recognition systems designed to conceal soft-biometric information at feature level. These works have reported impressive results, but usually do not consider specific attacks in their analysis of privacy protection. In most cases, the privacy protection capabilities of these schemes are tested through simple machine learning-based classifiers and visualisations of dimensionality reduction tools. In this work, we introduce an attack on feature level-based facial soft–biometric privacy-enhancement techniques. The attack is based on two observations: (1) to achieve high recognition accuracy, certain similarities between facial representations have to be retained in their privacy-enhanced versions; (2) highly similar facial representations usually originate from face images with similar soft-biometric attributes. Based on these observations, the proposed attack compares a privacy-enhanced face representation against a set of privacy-enhanced face representations with known soft-biometric attributes. Subsequently, the best obtained similarity scores are analysed to infer the unknown soft-biometric attributes of the attacked privacy-enhanced face representation. That is, the attack only requires a relatively small database of arbitrary face images and the privacy-enhancing face recognition algorithm as a black-box. In the experiments, the attack is applied to two representative approaches which have previously been reported to reliably conceal the gender in privacy-enhanced face representations. It is shown that the presented attack is able to circumvent the privacy enhancement to a considerable degree and is able to correctly classify gender with an accuracy of up to approximately 90% for both of the analysed privacy-enhancing face recognition systems. Future works on privacy-enhancing face recognition are encouraged to include the proposed attack in evaluations on privacy protection.

Zapri